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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The American federal government vehemently resists the notion that marijuana has any potential
therapeutic utility for the past five decades, and yet it unofficially continues to supply
marijuana for therapeutic uses to a few medical patients under a government program.1 For
the past 29 years, marijuana has resided under the federal controlled substance classification
reserved for chemical substances that serve no medical purpose.2 Yet, during the same time
that the federal government has defended this restrictive classification it has quietly recognized
marijuana's medical potential by approving the use of synthesized drugs containing many of
marijuana's active ingredients.3
Few governmental issues have elicited more schizophrenic, inconsistent, or seemingly illogical
responses from the federal government than the issue of medical marijuana (also known as hemp
in the industrial arena and cannabis in the medical arena).4 The highly-politically-charged
symbolism with which marijuana has been associated for most of the twentieth century has had
a dramatic effect on the federal government's approach to the medical marijuana issue ever
1See Lester Grinspoon, M.D. & James B. Bakalar, Marihuana, the Forbidden Medicine 22 (1997).
2See id. at 13.
3See Allison L. Bergstrom, Medical Use of Marijuana: A Look at Federal & State Responses to California' [sic] Compassionate Use Act,
2 DePaul J. Health Care L. 155, 163 (Fall, 1997).
4See Jack Herer, Hemp & the Marijuana Conspiracy: The Emperor Wears No Clothes 1 (Chris Conrad et al.
eds., 1995).
3since the first federal marijuana legislation was passed in 1937.5 This paper is intended
to demonstrate how the Federal Bureau of Narcotics's propagation of negative images associating
marijuana with the anti-social behavior of marginal socio-economic groups in the 1930's still
influences the federal government's marijuana policies today. This paper traces the history
of marijuana's legal, from its legal status America's infancy, where many colonies considered
marijuana such a valuable industrial and medical resource that some actually mandated its cultivation6,
to its present-day status as an illicit substance that is rarely used in the industrial arena
and has no officially recognized medical utility under federal law.
Chapter 1 discusses the ``pre-Anslinger'' history of marijuana in America, examining the many
industrial and medical purposes for which it was used before the onslaught of the anti-marijuana
propaganda campaign waged by the Harry Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the
1930's and 1940's. It also examines the ways in which the Bureau propagated an image of marijuana
as a psychosis-causing recreational drug used by socially marginal classes and racial groups
to tap into the most elitist and racist sensibilities of the non-marginal public and gain emotion-based
support for a de facto ban on marijuana for any purpose despite the initial objections of medical
experts. Finally, it discusses the ways that the influence of this ``Anslingerian'' image
of marijuana as the ``killer weed'' that federal drug enforcement agencies propagated in the
1930's continues to manifest itself in federal drug enforcement agencies' refusal to allow
marijuana's medical potential to even be explored by medical agencies such as the Food and
Drug Administration even today.
5See Gregg A. Bilz, The Medical Use of Marijuana: The Politics of Medicine, 13 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 117, 120
(Spring, 1992).
6See Herer, supra note 4, at 1.
4Chapter 2 focuses more closely on the issues facing supporters of medical marijuana under federal
law as it stands today. It also examines more closely the role that the Food and Drug Administration
currently plays in determining the medical potential of marijuana, and the reasons that the
FDA's role is more limited with respect to marijuana than it would be with other prospective
new drugs. Section A discusses the procedures that any group wishing to sponsor a study of
marijuana's medical utility must follow before the DEA will even allow them to conduct such
a study. It also outlines the rigorous process that this sponsor must follow after obtaining
DEA permission to study marijuana if it wishes to obtain the approval of the Food and Drug
Administration to market marijuana for therapeutic use. Section B discusses the problems that
marijuana would have meeting these procedural requirements under current law, and in terms
of the problems marijuana would have meeting the Food and Drug Administration's new-drug-approval
requirements in terms of the problems facing anyone attempting to get the DEA to delegate any
decision-making authority on this issue to the Food and Drug Administration in the first place.
It argues that although marijuana may or may not meet the Food and Drug Administration's standards
for acceptability as a medical drug, the DEA's policies continue to prevent the FDA or any
other medical organization from ever even getting the opportunity to examine marijuana's utility.
The DEA's ``Anslingerian'' marijuana classifications have usurped the Food and Drug Administration's
general authority to determine a drug's medical utility in the case of marijuana just as the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics usurped the American Medical Association's authority to do so in
the 1930's. Moreover, the DEA's ``Anslingerian'' anti-marijuana stance continues to prevent
an empirical examination of marijuana's therapeutic potential by medical experts to this day.
The paper does not discuss the recent battles between the federal government and several states
sparked by the recent attempts of states to circumvent federal marijuana prohibitions by passing
5referenda legalizing medical marijuana under state law. Although the federal responses to
the state medical marijuana legalization also tend to be heavily influenced by the ``Anslingerian''
politics of the early twentieth century, the issues raised by each state's particular laws
on the issue are distinct. Consequently, each particular state battle has had its own unique
history that demands a far more detailed discussion than this paper can provide. Furthermore,
the battle between the states and the federal government encompasses many constitutional issues
concerning federalism and the rights of the states that are largely beyond the scope of this
paper.
Instead, this paper focuses purely on the issue facing those seeking to gain medical marijuana's
legal acceptance under federal law. It examines the problems that federal drug enforcement
agencies have had with marijuana from the era of the Marijuana Tax Act through the recent federal
rescheduling litigation, and discusses how the same ``Anslingerian'' politics that drove anti-drug
authorities to remove marijuana from the jurisdiction of medical authorities in the 1930's
have driven current anti-drug authorities to keep the medical marijuana issue out of the jurisdiction
of the FDA and other medical organizations to this day.
6Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
Marijuana's current status under federal law, when viewed amidst all the negative symbolism
that has been associated with marijuana throughout much of the twentieth century, might lead
one to believe that marijuana has always held a somewhat demonic status in American society.
A closer examination of marijuana's history in America, however, indicates that before the
1930's the marijuana plant actually held a status in America quite different than the ``chemical-pariah-like''
status with which it is branded today. Up until the 1930's, the medical community regarded
marijuana not as a chemical menace, but as a valuable therapeutic tool useful in the treatment
of a wide variety of medical maladies. Likewise, the industrial applications for the marijuana
plant have proven so numerous and so varied throughout much of American history that as recently
as 1938 industrial hemp was hailed as America's newest billion-dollar industry.7
Marijuana's current status as a chemical pariah under federal law as well as in the public's
eyes did not begin to emerge significantly until Harry Anslinger took over the Federal Bureau
of Narcotics and began to wage a war against marijuana aimed at outlawing its use in the federal
statutes and demonizing it in the public's eyes.8 This chapter will examine marijuana's history
in America, tracing marijuana's legal and social status from America's infancy, where it was
considered a valuable industrial and medical commodity, to the present, where federal law reflects
7See Marty Bergoen & Roger Lee Clark, Hemp as an Alternative to Wood Fiber in Oregon, 11 J. Envtl. L. & Litig.
119, 121-122 (1996).
8See Herer, supra note 4, at 24.
7a view of marijuana as a chemical menace serving no possible purpose other than the creation
of social ills.
Section A discusses marijuana's history before the 1930's, during which time it enjoyed a favorable
legal status, and actually served a wide variety of industrial and medical purposes in American
society. Section B discusses the highly politically-charged anti-marijuana campaign waged
by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics under the direction of Harry Anslinger that brought about
the downfall of marijuana's legal and social status in the 1930's in spite of marijuana's many
socially beneficial applications. Finally, Section C illustrates the ways in which the same
negative symbolism and anti-marijuana propaganda that Harry Anslinger used to push the first
federal anti-marijuana legislation through Congress in 1937 has been used by current federal
drug enforcement authorities to justify their refusal to allow federal law to reflect marijuana's
medical utility even as other federal programs unofficially do so.
A.
8THE INDUSTRIAL, MEDICAL, AND RECREATIONAL USE OF MARIJUANA BEFORE 1937
INDUSTRIAL USE
With all the attention that the medical and recreational use that marijuana has received, it
is often overlooked that the marijuana plant has a rather extensive history of utility in other
arenas aside from the medicinal and recreational arenas. Certain forms of the marijuana plant
have historically served, and continue to serve, many valuable industrial purposes as well.
The fibers of the hemp plant are extremely sturdy, and have been very valuable in the cloth
and textile industries. The lighter fibers of the hemp plant have been a valuable source of
raw materials for making paper, while the heavier fibers have been used to make everything
from cloth for clothing to rope.9 Today, the sturdy hemp fibers are even used in the manufacture
of certain construction materials (such as fiberboard, or even beams).10 With all the uses
that the hemp plant has in the industrial arena, it should not come as any surprise (though
it often does in today's decidedly anti-marijuana political climate) that the hemp plant has
quite an extensive history of industrial use in the Western world in both Europe and the United
States.
Europeans were almost certainly growing and cultivating ``industrial hemp'' for the use of
its fiber for paper and textiles as early as the Renaissance11, although some argue that it
9See Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 126.
10See id.
11See Jerome L. Himmelstein, The Strange Career of Marijuana: Politics and Ideology of Drug Control in
9may have come from Asia as many as 10,000 years ago during the migration across the Bering
Strait.12 One of the first reports of hemp in the New World came from John De Verrazano, who
discovered it in what is now Virginia growing wild in 1524.13 Since the clothing made from
hemp was very sturdy and long-lasting and it grew well without requiring as much care (flourishing
without pesticides),14 Spanish and English settlers grew hemp as a major source of fiber and
seed from the sixteenth century well on into the nineteenth century.15 Interestingly, hemp
was actually considered such an important crop that some of the first laws regarding the Marijuana
plant were actually ``must-grow'' laws that required colonial farmers to grow a certain amount
of hemp when they farmed, lest they face criminal sanctions.16 The hemp plant was even made
acceptable as legal tender in some colonies in order to encourage its growth.17 A humorous
illustration of the drastically different attitudes that the colonists held toward the hemp
plant's value in colonial times as compared to the prevailing attitudes of today is the fact
that drafts of the American Declaration of Independence were written on paper made from hemp.18
It must seem ironic to the many opponents of the marijuana plant that many believe could contribute
significantly to the downfall of American society that the plant actually played a significant
role in America's birth!
Hemp continued to be a major source of fiber for paper and textiles in America through much
America 21 (1983).
12See Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 120-121.
13See id. at 121.
14See Ed Rosenthal & Steve Kubby, Why Marijuana Should Be Legal 59 (1996).
15See Himmelstein, supra note 11 at 2.
16See Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 121.
17See Herer, supra note 4, at 1.
18See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158.
10of the 1800's.19 However, in the late 1800's, hemp production in the United States dropped
off somewhat.20 The end of slavery following the Civil War made hemp a more difficult and
expensive crop to grow and process, because of the labor-intensive nature of stripping the
hemp fibers for conversion into paper and textile products.21 It became cheaper to import
hemp cloth and hemp products from other countries, and hemp farming as a big cash crop fell
off in the United States.22 Still, it was widely recognized that if technology yielded a machine
or procedure by which the hemp could be harvested and stripped more cheaply and labor-extensively,
hemp would again become a prominent industry in the United States.23 In fact, even during
the hearings concerning the Marihuana Tax Act of 193724, some of the biggest opponents to the
Act's passage were manufacturers of hemprope, hempseed, and hempoil, who were concerned about
the impact the act would have on their economic interests.25
Unfortunately for these manufacturers, however, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was passed26,
putting a tax on hemp dealing that hemp in the United States a prohibitively expensive and
bureaucratically time-consuming crop to grow27. Consequently, despite the claims of a 1938
Popular Mechanics article that the invention of hemp harvesting and stripping technology would
make hemp ``the new billion dollar industry'' in America,28 the obstacles that the Marihuana
Tax Act placed in the way of the growth of the hemp industry effectively eliminated the legal
19See Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 121.
20See Himmelstein, supra note 11 at 21.
21See Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 121.
22See Himmelstein, supra note 11 at 21.
23See Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 121.
24See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158 (discussed in greater detail infra Chapter 1, Section B).
25See Himmelstein, supra note 11, at 70.
26The Marihuana Tax Act was passed, at least in part, due to pressure from other industries (such as the cotton, timber, and
chemical industries) who competed with the hemp industry in the arena of textile and paper manufacturing. See Bergstrom,
supra note 3, at 158.
27See id.
28Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 121-122.
11sales of hemp.29
The Marihuana Tax Act, in combination with a long line of other U.S. legislative actions, has
heavily influenced economic, social, and environmental values all over the world, resulting
in severe decreases in worldwide hemp harvesting.30 In spite of the effect that U.S. attitudes
toward marijuana has had on worldwide hemp production, however, hemp continues to be a major
source of industrial materials in other parts of the world that have not been so heavily influenced
in the twentieth century by U.S. sensibilities. In China, for example, where the growth in
the population has necessitated maximal use of renewable resources, hemp continues to be a
major source of both cloth and paper.31 Likewise, in countries that had been allied with the
Communist Eastern block, such as Poland, Hungary, and the Ukraine, have grown hemp for its
utility as cloth fiber for years.32 Still, the long-term effect of the Marihuana Tax Act has
been to severely curtail the industrial use of hemp in America since the late 1930's.
MEDICAL USE
At least as extensive as marijuana's pre-1937 history as an industrial crop is marijuana's
history as an oft prescribed medicinal agent, both in the United States, and abroad. Until
the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act's passage in 1937,33 U.S. doctors had as many as 28 different
prescriptions containing cannabis that they used to treat various ailments.34 The history
29The Marihuana Tax Act was modeled after legislation aimed at machine guns. It \required a tax stamp on all sales of
hemp products. Also like machine guns, the Federal government refused to issue such stamps, eectively eliminating legal sales
of hemp." Bergoen & Clark, supra note 7, at 122.
30See id. at 123.
31See id.
32See id.
33See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158 (discussed in greater detail infra Chapter 1, Section B).
34See Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Fecto Legalization of Pot and the Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U.
12of the medicinal use of marijuana, however, can be traced back thousands of years to ancient,
non-Western medicine.
The earliest evidence of the therapeutic use of marijuana was published about five thousand
years ago in China under the reign of Chen Nung.35 Among other things, it was prescribed to
treat ``malaria, constipation, rheumatic pains, ``absentmindedness'', and ``female disorders''.36
In India as well as Africa, it was used to treat dysentery, malaria, and different fevers.37
Later, it was also utilized during the Helenistic eras, and in medieval Europe.38 It was utilized
in England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for everything from treating depression39
to treating various inflammations.40
The use of marijuana derivatives in Western medicine did not reach its heyday, however, until
the nineteenth century.41 In his book, Marijuana, The Forbidden Medicine, Lester Grinspoon
writes:
``During [cannabis's] heyday, from 1840 to 1900, more than one hundred papers were
published in the Western medical literature recommending it for various illnesses
and discomforts.42 It could almost be said that physicians of a century ago knew
more about cannabis than contemporary physicians do; certainly they were more
interested in exploring its therapeutic potential.''43
The rst Western doctor to extensively study the medical use of cannabis was Dr. W.B. O'Shaughnessy.44 As
a young physician at the College of Calcutta, he became curious about it when he observed its
use in India.45 In order to satisfy himself that it was safe, he tested cannabis on animals.46
Mich. J.L. Ref. 707, 749 (Spring, 1998).
35See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 3.
36Id.
37See id.
38See id.
39See id.
40\The New English Dispensatory of 1764 recommended applying hemp roots to the skin for inammation, a remedy that
was already popular in eastern Europe." Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1 at 3.
41Id. at 4.
44See id.
45See id.
46See Michael Aldrich, History of Therapeutic Cannabis, in Cannabis in Medical Practice 35, 44 (Mary Lynn Mathre,
13Once satisfied with its safety, he began testing it on patients, where he discovered cannabis
to be a fairly effective analgesic as well as an anticonvulsive remedy for treating the muscle
spasms that typically accompanied diseases like tetanus and rabies.47 He also found that if
he gave cannabis tinctures to people stricken with cholera he could ``stop the vomiting and
diarrhea that make the disease fatal.''48 In 1842, Dr. O'Shaughnessy returned to England
and gave the marijuana derivative cannabis to pharmacists, and U.S. and European doctors started
prescribing it for various illnesses and other conditions.49
In 1850, it was included in the U.S.'s list of officially recognized medicinal drugs (the Pharmacopoeia).50
In 1860, the Ohio State Medical Society held the U.S.'s first conference on medicinal marijuana,
where they reported ``successful treatments of stomach pain, childbirth psychosis, chronic
cough, gonorrhea, and marijuana's general usefulness as an analgesic for inflammatory or neuralgic
pains.''51 Later, the Civil War edition to the U.S. Dispensatory also devoted a number of
pages to the usefulness of cannabis as medicine52, and noted that cannabis was ``a drug that
has special value in some morbid conditions and the intrinsic merit and safety of which entitles
it to a place once held in therapeutics.''53 The Dispensatory also noted that cannabis was
effective as ``a decided aphrodisiac, to increase the appetite, and occasionally to induce
the cataleptic state...to cause sleep, to allay spasm, to compose nervous inquietude, and to
relieve pain.''54 It was also specifically recommended cannabis for many convulsive conditions.55
By the 1880's some doctors were even prescribing cannabis as an anti-depressant, using it to
ed., 1997).
47See Mathre, ed., supra note 46, at 44.
48Id. at 44-5.
49See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 4.
50See Bilz, supra note 5, at 118.
51Mathre, ed., supra note 46, at 46.
52See id.
53Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158.
54Mathre, ed., supra note 46, at 46.
55See id.
14help alleviate the mental stress in patients who were suffering from terminal illnesses.56
The invention of the hypodermic syringe for injecting opiates along with the development of
synthetic drugs led to the curtailment of the prevalent use of marijuana as a medicinal agent
around the beginning of the twentieth century.57 The hypodermic needle made opiate painkillers
easier to administer, and doctors preferred the superior dosage control that the synthetic
drugs purported to offer.58
The decreased prevalence of its usage around the beginning of the twentieth century did not,
however, signal marijuana's movement from medical agent to illicit substance. Around the same
time that medical marijuana prescription decreased, the federal government began passing its
first major drug control laws.59 Interestingly, marijuana was not among the drugs mentioned.60
Although the prevalence of its prescription by doctors decreased, pharmacists continued to
keep it in stock at drug stores along with other remedies right up until the passage of the
Marihuana Tax Act in 1937.61 In fact, even during the legislative hearings for the Marihuana
Tax Act itself, C. Hester (Assistant General Counsel for the Treasury Department) indicated
that one of the purposes of the tax was to facilitate the use of medicinal marijuana.62 It
was only in 1942, five years after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act,63 that marijuana was
removed from the U.S. Pharmacopoeia,64 sparking the debate over medicinal marijuana that continues
to this day.
56See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 5.
57See id. at 7.
58See id.
59See Matthew Segal, Overdue Process: Why Denial of Physician-Prescribed Marijuana to Terminally Ill Patients Violates the United States Constitution,
22 Seattle U. L. Rev. 235, 239 (Summer, 1998).
60See id.
61See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158.
62See Bilz, supra note 5, at 120.
63See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158 (discussed in greater detail infra Chapter 1, Section B).
64See Bilz, supra note 5, at 118.
15RECREATIONAL USE
Despite the many applications and potential uses for the marijuana plant in the industrial
and medical arenas, the psychoactive use of marijuana for recreational purposes has been the
use that has attracted the most attention and generated by far the most controversy in America
in the twentieth century. When the Marihuana Tax Act65 was passed in 1937 severely restricting
the trafficking of marijuana regardless of the purpose of the trafficking, the social ill that
the Act's proponents claimed the Act would treat was the recreational use of marijuana and
the social problems that supposedly accompanied its use in the U.S. during the early 1900's.66
Interestingly, recreational use of marijuana in the United States had only been at all prevalent
for a relatively short period of time before the Marihuana Tax Act was passed and use of any
kind effectively became illegal. A look at the history of marijuana use in the U.S. in the
years before the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act offers some insight into why recreational
marijuana use became such a high-priority social ill so quickly and how the perceived menace
of recreational use was used to gain passage of laws that effectively outlawed the industrial
and medical use of marijuana as well as its recreational use.
As previously stated above, psychoactive recreational use of marijuana had quite a brief pre-1937
history in the United States. It was a relatively rare phenomenon before the twentieth century,
aside from a few cases of experimental use by a few writers of the time.67 However, recreational
use flourished in Central America and Mexico in the late nineteenth century, and soon Mexican
agricultural workers in search of jobs in the southwestern U.S. brought with them the practice
65See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158 (discussed in greater detail infra Chapter 1, Section B).
66See id.
67See Himmelstein, supra note 11, at 22. Writers such as Fitzhugh Ludlow and Bayard Taylor had experimented with hashish
in the late nineteenth century. See id.
16of recreational marijuana use in the early twentieth century.68 Marijuana use was noted among
Mexicans living in Texas in the 1910's and later among Mexicans in the Southwest, West, and
even up into Chicago by the 1920's.69 Marijuana use spread to poor African-Americans in the
1920's, first noted in New Orleans, and later in African-American populations all over the
southern and northern U.S.70 By the time that the Marihuana Tax Act was passed in 1937,71 African-American
as well as white musicians involved in the jazz scene were using marijuana recreationally.
Contrary to lamentations of much of the anti-marijuana propaganda of the late 1930's, use of
marijuana among adolescents did not become a prevalent phenomenon until the 1960's, long after
the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.72
There is evidence that the phenomenon of marijuana use by socially marginal groups such as
these was a major contributing factor in fostering the anti-marijuana sentiment that led to
the passing of the Marihuana Tax Act. During the years before the Act's passage, marijuana
was widely associated with African-Americans, Mexicans, and other socially marginal groups
that were prejudicially perceived as prone to aggressive and violent behavior.73 Some historians
have argued that marijuana's association with these supposedly violent groups led to its association
with the fostering of violent behavior in the minds of the non-marginal population.74 This
association in the minds of the general population of violent behavior with the ``violent''
Mexicans may or may not have been a significant public concern in the years leading up to the
passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.
68See Id.
69See Id.
70See Id.
71See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 158 (discussed in greater detail infra Chapter 1, Section B).
72See Himmelstein, supra note 11, at 22.
73See Bilz, supra note 5, at 119.
74See id.
17There is still some debate as to whether or not the public's fear of the ``violent, doped-up
Mexican'' was actually widespread, significant, or even genuine.75 What is not generally open
for debate, however, is that the claims (true or not) of public officials that the public was
highly concerned about ``violent marijuana smokers'' certainly contributed significantly to
the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act. In his campaign against marijuana in the years prior
to the passage of the act, Harry Anslinger (Commissioner of Narcotics at the time) made many
claims that marijuana caused violent and aggressive behavior as well as mental deterioration.76
Moreover, during the hearings in which the Marihuana Tax Act was examined by the House Ways
and Means Committee, much of the evidence presented to argue in favor of the Act's passage
took the form of newspaper articles noting the prevalence of marijuana addiction and linking
it causally to criminal behavior.77 Thus, though the recreational use of marijuana in the
United States had a much shorter pre-Marijuana-Tax-Act chronological history than did its use
in medicine or industry, it certainly had the most tumultuous pre-1937 history of the three
uses; and it was certainly the first use to become a significant espoused concern of public
officials before the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act.
B.
75See Himmelstein, supra note 11, at 28-29 (noting that supporters of the anti-Mexican sentiment hypothesis fail to show
evidence of signicant public concern regarding Mexicans and marijuana use other than letters from a few of Louisiana's local
ocials and the claims of Harry Anslinger, the Commissioner of Narcotics at the time, that he was responding to a signicant
public concern.)
76See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 7-8.
77See id.
18THE BIRTH OF ``ANSLINGERIAN'' POLITICS: HARRY ANSLINGER AND THE CAMPAIGN THAT DEMONIZED MARIJUANA
As useful as marijuana and its derivatives proved in the industrial and medicinal throughout
much of the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century, the introduction of recreational
psychoactive marijuana use by marginal minority groups in the early 1910's sparked the beginnings
of public concern about the physiological consequences of marijuana use. Anti-marijuana activists
such as Father Earle Rowell began to believe that marijuana cause madness, and traveled across
the country preaching against marijuana and burning hemp fields during the Depression.78 People
like Father Rowell helped initiate the first rumblings of an anti-marijuana movement that eventually
led to the passage of the first anti-marijuana legislation in American history, and a change
the way the public would view marijuana for decades to come.
These rumblings of anti-marijuana sentiment would explode into a frenzy of anti-marijuana propaganda
in 1931 when Andrew Mellon, in his role as Secretary of the Treasury, appointed Harry J. Anslinger
to head up the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.79 Anslinger had been serving in the Treasury Department
prior to this appointment, and had a history of aggressively pursuing the enforcement of earlier
anti-drug legislation during that time.80 After taking the helm of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
he immediately focused his energy on launching an all-out war against marijuana.81 Under Anslinger's
direction, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics waged a large-scale propaganda campaign aimed at
convincing the public that marijuana was addictive and that it caused everything from violent
crimes to psychosis to mental deterioration.82 He appealed to the public's racist sentiments,
78See Bilz, supra note 5, at 120.
79See Herer, supra note 4, at 24.
80See Vitiello, supra note 34, at 749.
81See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 7-8.
82See id.
19causally linking marijuana use to the behavior of marginal ethnic groups that were prejudicially
perceived as violent at that time.83 He continually disseminated horror stories about people
who committed violent murders, allegedly because they had used marijuana, to the press.84 His
campaign was even responsible for the famous anti-marijuana propaganda film Reefer Madness,
which was actually regarded as a genuine attempt to address a serious social issue at the time.85
Anslinger's anti-marijuana campaign was a far-reaching campaign that influenced virtually all
of the information the public received about marijuana during the 1930's and 1940's. Virtually
all of the magazine articles in the mid-1930's that called attention to the ``marijuana problem''
received the information on which they based their contentions from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics.86
Obviously, such a far-reaching campaign was bound to affect the way that governmental officials
addressed the issue of marijuana, and the hysteria generated by Anslinger's campaign led to
the incorrect classification of marijuana as a narcotic.87 This mis-classification led policymakers
to model the first twentieth-century marijuana legislation after other pieces of narcotics
legislation rather than after post-prohibition-alcohol or tobacco legislation.88
Anslinger's campaign eventually led to the promulgation of the Marihuana Tax Act, America's
first anti-marijuana legislation, in 1937.89 Under this legislation;
83See Vitiello, supra note 34, at 776.
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20''anyone using the hemp plant for certain defined industrial or medical purposes
was required to register and pay a tax of a dollar an ounce. A person using
marihuana for any other purpose had to pay a tax of $100 an ounce on unregistered
transactions. Those who failed to comply were subject to large fines or
prison for tax evasion...its purpose was to discourage recreational marihuana
smoking.''90
The legislation made marijuana for any purpose other than medical use prohibitively expensive. Moreover, it
made even medical use virtually impossible because of extensive paperwork requirements placed on doctors
attempting to use it.91 The Act also contained a tax stamp requirement for all sales of hemp
products, which the federal government almost invariably refused to issue.92 The combination
of financial and bureaucratic obstacles effectively eliminated legal dealings in hemp products,
regardless of purpose.93
The influence of Anslinger's anti-marijuana campaign over policymakers' propagation of the
Marihuana Tax Act is evident in both the information that they used to justify the need for
the Act and the reactions of policymakers when medical experts criticized the evidentiary basis
for their claims that the Act was necessary. During the 1937 hearings in which the House Ways
and Means Committee examined the Marihuana Tax Act, W.C. Woodward, a representative of the
American Medical Association who supported Congress's aims but lobbied for less restrictive
legislation to protect marijuana's medical potential pointed out that Congress had virtually
no empirical medical proof that marijuana was addictive, prominently used by adolescents, or
causally connected to violent behavior.94 He pointed out that all the evidence on which they
based the need for this legislation came in the form of newspaper articles, and not from medical
sources.95
91See id.
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en & Clark, supra note 7, at 122.
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21Due to the politically charged nature of this issue that resulted from Anslinger's campaign,
however, Woodward's criticisms of the quality of legislators' evidence base only served to
turn legislators against him. They questioned him critically about everything from his educational
background to his relationship to the American medical Association, never seriously considering
the merits of his objections to their evidence base, until they finally cut him out of the
discussion once and for all, admonishing him for throwing ``obstacles in the way of something
that the Federal Government is trying to do.''96 Thus, despite the lack of any evidence of
the significant societal harms of marijuana other than various news articles, most of which
were fed to the press by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the Marihuana Tax Act was signed
on August 2, 1937,97 effectively eliminating the legal use of marijuana for any purpose.
Up until the passage of the Marijuana Tax Act, Anslinger's anti-marihuana campaign appeared
to be aimed at eliminating only the recreational use of marijuana. In fact, during the legislative
hearings for the Marihuana Tax Act, C. Hester (Asst. General Counsel for the Treasury Department
and a witness in the hearings) actually testified that one of the purposes for which the marijuana
tax money would be used was to facilitate the medical use of marijuana.98 However, Anslinger's
anti-marijuana campaign eventually began to focus on eliminating the use of marijuana in the
medical realm as well. The Bureau began making it increasingly difficult to obtain marijuana
for scientific studies, and when studies were possible, the Bureau would only accept as legitimate
those studies that painted a negative picture of marijuana.99 Marijuana was removed from the
Pharmacopoeia in 1942.100 Finally, Anslinger turned his attention to aligning the dominant
medical opinions with the Bureau's anti-marijuana platform.
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22Shortly after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, New York's Mayor La Guardia formed a large
team of M.D.'s and Ph.D.'s to study the sociological, medical, and psychological consequences
of marijuana use in New York City.101 The report, published in 1944, concluded that there was
no proof that marijuana caused violent, aggressive behavior.102 Even before the report was
published in 1944, Anslinger undermined and suppressed it. In 1942 when the Journal of the
American Medical Association published an editorial that validated the La Guardia study as
``a careful study'', and actually mentioned a few of marijuana's potential medical uses, Anslinger
quickly responded, writing a letter to the AMA Journal severely criticizing the La Guardia
study.103
Mysteriously, at that point, the American Medical Association ``made an extraordinary about-face
and joined the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the denunciation of the La Guardia Report.''104
The Journal then published an editorial that advised policymakers to disregard such an ``unscientific''
study and to ``continue to regard marihuana as a menace wherever it is purveyed.''105 Although
it has stopped publishing evidentiarily weak papers lamenting the dangers of marijuana use,106
the Journal remained consistently weary of indicating opinions that would inject it in any
significant way into the politics associated with the marijuana issue from that point, and
for years afterward.107 Anslinger had, with the final suppression of all opposing medical evidence,
ushered in an era of anti-marijuana sentiment that would dominate America's overall opinion
regarding marijuana, regardless of the purpose of its use, from 1944 until the 1960's when
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23recreational use increased again.108
It is clear that, whatever the factors were that contributed to the desire of governmental
policymakers to pass anti-marijuana legislation, the factors were grounded less in empirical
medical evidence of marijuana's effect on human behavior than they were in other more political
factors. 35 years after the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, the National Commission on Marijuana
and Drug Abuse reexamined the Act and found that the Act was misguided and generally based
on misguided and incorrect hypotheses.109
It is also clear that Harry Anslinger's personal fanatical hatred of drugs single-handedly
played a large role in powering the late-1930's anti-marijuana movement. There are several
indications that paper and textile manufacturers, chemical companies and other industries that
competed with the hemp industry in the in the production of paper and other hemp products also
applied some of the pressure to policymakers that resulted in the passage of the Marihuana
Tax Act.110 These industries, after all, were some of the biggest proponents of the Marihuana
Tax Act besides the drug enforcement officials.111 However, while pressure from Anslinger or
from competing industries on federal policymakers may explain the passage of the Marihuana
Tax Act, it fails to explain the public concerns that sparked the passage of the many state
and local anti-marijuana laws that followed the Marihuana Tax Act112 and indicated the increased
entrenchment of anti-marijuana public sentiment that is still prominent today.
In order for Harry Anslinger and other proponents of sweeping anti-marijuana legislation still
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24needed a way to garner public support for their anti-marijuana cause so that the movement could
weather the accusations that proponents of the Marihuana Tax Act had no evidence to prove that
marijuana actually caused the problems they said it did. The key that the Act's proponents
found to mobilizing public sentiment against marijuana was in mobilizing the non-marginal public's
racist sensibilities. Racist sentiments toward Mexicans and African-Americans that predominated
the U.S. early in the twentieth century played a key role in enabling crusaders like Harry
Anslinger to push the Marihuana Tax Act through to passage despite a lack of empirical evidence
of marijuana's harmful effects.
Negative symbolic images associating marijuana almost entirely with recreational use by marginal
social and ethnic groups played a key role in generating the negative public attitudes toward
marijuana that enabled federal anti-drug agencies to get marijuana banned completely despite
its many medical and industrial applications. There is still some disaggrement over between
those who argue that a genuine public concern over the image of the ``Mexican dope-smoking
menace'' necessitated the passage of anti-marijuana legislation and those who argue that Harry
Anslinger created the image of the ``Mexican dope-smoking menace'' to garner enough support
to gain the passage of anti-marijuana legislation. There is little argument, however, that
these racist and classist associations, regardless of their source, politically charged the
marijuana debate and focused attention on images of recreational use to such a large extent
that rational discussion of marijuana in any other context became virtually impossible.
The argument that the symbolic association of marijuana with marginal racial and social groups
created much of the anti-marijuana sentiment that led to the passing of the Marihuana Tax Act
is grounded in an examination of the demographics of the population of marijuana-smokers in
25the early 1900's. 113 The prevalent use of marijuana in the United States began with Mexican
migrant workers, then moved on to other prejudicially perceived groups such as African-Americans,
and members of the jazz scene in the 20's and 30's.114 During the depression, marginal groups
such as Mexicans came to be viewed as a distinct and unwelcome surplus, which heightened prejudicial
attitudes toward them as the depression wore on. Because the non-marginal white populace viewed
Mexicans as prone to violent and aggressive behavior115 and widely associated marijuana-smoking
with Mexicans, marijuana came to be widely causally associated with the socially undesirable
behavior in which these groups engaged.116 Thus, so the argument goes, local government officials
responded to this public outcry by lobbying people like Harry Anslinger to pass some kind of
law to stave off the onslaught of the ``marijuana menace'' that was sweeping the country.117
The argument that anti-marijuana legislation was a response to racist and classist associations
with marginal minority groups (Mexicans, in particular) does have some evidentiary support.
The hysteria surrounding marijuana use due in large part to its association with minority groups
caused it to be mis-classified as a narcotic118, and legislation concerning marijuana was consequently
modeled after other narcotics legislation rather than post-prohibition alcohol, or tobacco
legislation.119 In addition, Harry Anslinger himself claimed that his push for the Marihuana
Tax Act was simply a response to local requests for a solution the ``marijuana problem''.120
Critics of the theory that Anslinger's anti-marijuana campaign was simply a response to the
113See Himmelstein, supra note 11, at 27-30.
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26public's demands argue that Anslinger often exaggerated the public concern with the marijuana
issue121, and point to the fact that Anslinger offered only a few letters as proof of public
concern and most of them did not even specifically mention Mexicans. Even if Anslinger exaggerated
the public's concern with the phenomenon of Mexican marijuana-smokers or the public's belief
that marijuana use presented a significant social problem, racist and classist images associated
with marijuana still almost certainly powered the movement toward anti-marijuana legislation.
Anslinger himself believed that Mexicans were responsible for the marijuana problem,122 and
he unabashedly played on and evoked the anti-Mexican and anti-African-American sentiment that
did exist in order to further his public anti-marijuana propaganda campaign.123 He disseminated
stories through the Bureau of Narcotics about ``colored'' college students smoking marijuana
with white female students and getting them pregnant, or about ``Negroes'' high on marijuana
kidnapping young girls and infecting them with STD's, in order to garner public support for
anti-marijuana legislation.124
Thus, even if the anti-Mexican sentiment in society during the first part of the twentieth
century did not directly precipitate anti-marijuana legislation, Anslinger certainly capitalized
on what anti-Mexican sentiment did exist to bring anti-marijuana legislation to pass. He worked
hard to solidify an image of marijuana that inextricably linked it with visions of doped-up
Mexicans wreaking havoc on society, and this symbolism whipped up an atmosphere surrounding
marijuana so emotional and politically charged that medical experts who dared ask for empirical
proof that marijuana actually led to the violence and aggression that Anslinger claimed it
did, policymakers chastised these experts for ``getting in the way of something the government
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27was trying to do.''125 Once such emotion was stirred up, the empirical evidence was of little
consequence and passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and of the state-level anti-marijuana legislation
that followed became inevitable.
As a result of the war against marijuana and the image of the ``killer weed'' that Harry Anslinger
hammered into the public conscience, the legal treatment of marijuana during the decades between
the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and the 1960's consisted of the outlawing of marijuana
possession and sale at both state and federal levels and the systematic escalation of criminal
sanctions for either offense.126 The decade of the 1960's, however, brought with it a crumbling
of the public consensus regarding marijuana, its dangers, and the legitimacy of the sanctions
imposed on marijuana users.127 The 1960's marked the beginnings of a struggle that continues
to this day between those who contest the time-honored prohibitions of the past two decades
and the governmental establishment, which continues to cling to the classifications of the
Anslinger regime despite mounting evidence that those classifications are based on faulty and
highly political premises.
Marijuana use became prominent again in the 1960's, this time among middle-class youth128, and
the Marihuana Tax Act was found unconstitutional in 1969.129 In response to the unenforceability
of the Marihuana Tax Act as well as legislative concern about the resurgence of recreational
drug use, Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act of 1970.130 This Act placed all controlled
substances into one of five ``Schedule'' categories, Schedule I being the most restrictive
125See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 9-11.
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127See id. at 4.
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28and Schedule V being the least restrictive, depending on the substance's potential for abuse.131
Interestingly, the initial decisions about which drugs were placed on which schedules were
made, much like the decision to pass the Marihuana Tax Act decades earlier, without any authoritative
input from medical experts. Instead, the Justice Department---Attorney General John Mitchell
in conjunction with the Drug Enforcement Agency (formerly the Federal Bureau of Narcotics)---made
the final decision as to what substances were categorized under which schedules.132 Not surprisingly,
these officials placed marijuana on Schedule I, the most restrictive schedule.133 In placing
marijuana on Schedule I the DEA labeled marijuana a drug with no medical utility as well as
a high potential for abuse that could not be safely prescribed even under the care of a physician.134
The chief consequence of this classification was that marijuana could not be prescribed even
by physicians and could only be researched after the filing of special applications with various
federal agencies.135 Ironically, even as public sentiment began to change regarding marijuana
and its use, Congress passed legislation that usurped the medical community's control over
whether or not it could utilize marijuana and reflected the same image-based anti-marijuana
sentiment that had permeated the Anslinger era decades earlier.
The contention over the marijuana issue became even more starkly evident roughly a year later
when President Nixon, looking once and for all to establish conclusive evidence of marijuana's
dangers to justify its severe restriction, established the National Commission on Marijuana
and Drug Abuse to look into the marijuana problem.136 To Nixon's dismay, the commission found
that the original laws that outlawed were based on misguided and incorrect speculation regarding
131See Mary Lynn Mathre, Introduction, to Cannabis in Medical Practice 4 (Mary Lynn Mathre, ed., 1997).
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29marijuana's effects and social impact137, and recommended that the law be changed to decriminalize
the possession of marijuana when for personal use.138 In what has become the all-too-typical
response of policymakers when confronted with an argument that questions the accuracy of the
Anslinger vision of marijuana's dangers, Nixon responded by divorcing himself from his own
commission before the recommendations were even published and proclaiming that he would simply
refuse to follow any recommendation that involved the legalization of marijuana.139 Turning
a blind eye yet again to any evidence that contradicted Anslinger's anti-marijuana platform
or the accuracy of the ``killer weed'' image, policymakers dismissed the Commission's recommendations,
and the politically-based prohibitions continued.
C.
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301970 TO THE PRESENT: ``ANSLINGERIAN'' POLITICS MANIFESTED IN THE FEDERAL MARIJUANA RESCHEDULING LITIGATION AND IN THE ``COMPASSIONATE IND'' PROGRAM
The Controlled Substances Act replaced the Marihuana Tax Act as the Federal government's key
anti-marijuana legislation after 1970, and continues to impede efforts to look into marijuana's
medical utility to this day. Consequently, the focus of the medical marijuana debate after
the passage of the Controlled Substances Act has been on whether or not federal officials have
correctly placed marijuana on the most restrictive schedule under the Controlled Substances
Act for substances with a high potential for abuse and no medicinal value. Not surprisingly,
the federal government has responded schizophrenically to the issue, consistently opposing
large-scale efforts to reschedule marijuana and arguing that marijuana has never had significant
medical utility while quietly recognizing its medical utility in allowing its use on a small
scale through government programs. The federal government's schizophrenic approach results
from a clash between federal drug enforcement agencies' collective anti-marijuana concerns140
and considerations of medical necessity that have mandated a quiet recognition of marijuana's
utility through the ``Compassionate IND'' Program.141 This section discusses how the same governmental
inability to separate the negative symbolism associated with recreational marijuana use from
its attitudes medical marijuana that characterized the Anslinger era has manifested itself
in the government's consistent anti-rescheduling stance during the 22-year legal battle over
the issue. It also examines the medical considerations that led Congress to quietly approve
the medical use of marijuana as part of the ``Compassionate IND'' program even as the DEA was
refusing to reschedule. Finally, it demonstrates how the eventual suspension of the ``Compassionate
140See Abbie Critees-Leoni, Medical Use of Marijuana: Is the Debate a Smoke Screen for Movement Toward Legalization, 19
J. Legal Med. 273, 277 (June, 1998).
141See id. at 277-278.
31IND'' program reflected the government's continued ``Anslingerian'' inability to dissociate
itself from its fears of recreational marijuana use long enough to examine marijuana's therapeutic
potential objectively.
The government's battle against pro-medical-marijuana groups to keep marijuana classified as
a Schedule I substance began when NORML filed its first rescheduling petition with the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD, and the future DEA). Congress granted the right of
schedule challenges to interested parties who wished to do so and secured for those parties
the right to a hearing on their challenges as part of the Controlled Substances Act in 1970.142
It did so in order to allow for the reclassification of substances in the event that continued
research of a their properties led to the discovery of new medical benefits or other properties
that rendered it's classification incorrect or obsolete.143 Just two years after the passage
of the Controlled Substances Act, NORML put this rescheduling clause to the test by filing
the first rescheduling petition in 1972.144 The BNDD reacted to this petition swiftly and negatively.
Without even holding the hearings called for in the Controlled Substances Act, the Bureau refused
to even file the petition, claiming that the requirements of a treaty signed at a 1961 international
anti-drug convention did not permit them to file such a petition.145 NORML appealed this summary
dismissal to the D.C. Circuit, and the court found in NORML's favor.146 The court ruled that
such a dismissal without any merit-based findings contradicted the administrative process,
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32which called for findings on the merits.147
On remand in 1975, the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the case found that the 1961 treaty
did not prevent the rescheduling of marijuana as asserted by the BNDD, and proposed that the
proper response to the petition for the BNDD would be to hold the rescheduling hearings on
the issue that the Controlled Substances Act called for.148 As if neither the Court of Appeals
nor the Administrative Law Judge had said a word about the necessity of holding the hearings
on the rescheduling matter, however, the Acting Administrator of the BNDD (now renamed the
DEA) issued a final order that denied the petition without any hearings on the matter.149
The petitioners again appealed the summary petition dismissal to the D.C. Circuit, and again
the Court of Appeals ordered the DEA to comply with the rule-making procedures of the Controlled
Substances Act, and hold hearings.150 This time, the court also ordered the DEA to submit the
petition to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.151 The DEA did comply with the
order to refer the petition to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. However,
when they issued a recommendation in 1979 that marijuana remain on Schedule I, the DEA summarily
denied the rescheduling petition without holding the required hearings yet again.152
For a third time, the petitioners appealed the DEA's summary denial to the D.C. Circuit. Again,
the court remanded the case and instructed the DEA to submit the case to the Department of
Health and Human Services (formerly the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) for scientific
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33evaluation, and to hold the required hearings on the matter.153 Finally, in 1986, the DEA complied
and announced that hearings on the rescheduling of marijuana would be held before Administrative
Law Judge Francis Young.154 The hearings commenced in the summer of 1986, and continued for
two years.155 Finally, in 1988, Judge Young issued a ruling rejecting the standards the DEA
used to determine that marijuana did not have an accepted medical use.156 He determined that
marijuana should be deemed to have an accepted medical use (and should, therefore, be moved
to Schedule II) as long as a respectable minority in the medical community supported its use
in medical treatments.157 True to its unrelenting anti-marijuana stance, the DEA disregarded
the recommendations of its own judge, and denied the petition using the same eight-factor ``accepted
medical use'' test that Judge Young rejected to determine that marijuana did not have an accepted
medical use.158 Interestingly, several of these factors were impossible to satisfy for any
drug with a Schedule I classification. The requirement that a drug have general use and acceptance
before being removed from Schedule I, for example, would be impossible to meet because the
government's restrictions on Schedule I substances would prevent any general use or acceptance.159
Thus, the petitioners appealed a fourth time in 1991.160 This time, the petition was ordered
returned to the DEA for reconsideration of the factors used to determine medical acceptability.161
The DEA responded in 1992 by reworking the medical acceptability test, removing the ``impossible
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34factors'', disavowing any use of the ``impossible factors'' in their previous rejection of
the rescheduling petition, and denying the petition again.162 The petitioners appealed a fifth
time, this time alleging DEA bias in the decision-making process and objecting to allegedly
variant evidentiary standards utilized by the DEA in their decision-making processes.163 This
time, however, the court denied their appeal, finding no prejudicial influence in the evidentiary
standard, and the DEA issued a final denial of the marijuana rescheduling petition in 1994.164
Thus, 22 years, five appeals, and two adverse Administrative Law Judge opinions later, the
BNDD/DEA had achieved final and total official legal validation of their contention that marijuana
does not have medical utility under federal law despite significant evidence from the 1988
hearings that it does. This 22-year-long refusal to even explore the possibility that marijuana
might have some large-scale medical utility regardless of the sentiment in the medical community
seems like the typical anti-marijuana stance that drug enforcement agencies have been taking
since the Anslinger era beginning in the 1930's. However, the court's ultimate validation
of the Schedule I status of marijuana might cause one to question whether marijuana's prohibition
still generally stems from emotion-based negative symbolism, as it did during the Anslinger
era, or stems from new and more objective medical considerations.
The question of whether the primary motivations for the continued governmental resistance to
legalization of medicinal marijuana since 1970 are based in political considerations or medical
considerations is answered in large part by the government's quiet recognition of marijuana's
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35medical potential through the ``Compassionate IND'' program during its legal battle with NORML.
Even as the FBN/DEA was using every procedural means necessary to avoid even considering marijuana's
medical utility in 1976, Congress created the ``Compassionate IND'' program, which allowed
people in need of medical marijuana to obtain government-grown marijuana for therapeutic use.165
The history of this program, and of the circumstances behind its eventual termination in 1992166
illustrate yet again the extent to which the federal drug enforcement agencies' collective
inability to separate medical marijuana use from recreational marijuana use continues to drive
the government's public denial of marijuana's medical potential even as it quietly recognizes
that potential out of the public eye. From 1976 to 1988, the government quietly provided a
small number of medical patients with government-grown marijuana for therapeutic use even as
it vigorously denied marijuana's medical utility in its rescheduling legal battles.167 The
government left this program alone until events from 1989 to 1991 threatened to expand both
the number of patients in the program and the publicity surrounding the program. At that time,
the Bush administration ordered the FDA to shut down the program, not because marijuana's medical
utility had suddenly come into question, but because the Bush administration felt that the
program may send a ``bad message'' about marijuana use that could undermine its overall anti-drug
stance.168 A more detailed look into the program's history further illustrates this point.
In 1976, the government officially kicked off the Compassionate IND Program when Robert Randall,
a glaucoma patient,169 became the first recipient of government-grown medical marijuana under
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36the program.170 The marijuana was, and still is, grown on a government farm at the University
of Mississippi at Oxford under the supervision of the National Institute of Drug Abuse.171 For
12 to 13 years after Randall first began receiving medical marijuana under this program, the
government recognized the medical utility of marijuana in at least six other instances, providing
marijuana under the Compassionate IND Program to roughly a half of a dozen other medical patients.
Through 1988, the government allowed this program to run relatively unhindered. It seemed
that as long as the program remained small and out of the public eye, the government was willing
to quietly allow access to the medical benefits of marijuana to a few people who needed it.
However, several events that occurred beginning in 1989 would ensure that the Compassionate
IND Program would not remain a small, low-profile program for long.
During the late 1980's, the process for applying for a Compassionate IND was streamlined from
an application that took as many as 50 hours to finish down to an application that could be
completed in as little as an hour.172 This removed many of the bureaucratic obstacles that
had often discouraged people from seeking marijuana through the program. This streamlined
process, along with publicity from a Harvard survey regarding the medical benefits of marijuana
led to a surge in Compassionate IND applications,173 and by the end of 1989 the number of patients
receiving the marijuana under the program had risen sharply to 34.174 The government's Compassionate
IND Program received yet more unwanted publicity as a result of the highly publicized case
of Kenneth and Barbra Jenks, who had contracted AIDS and had been arrested for using marijuana
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37to relieve nausea and vomiting caused by the AIDS treatment drug AZT.175 The Jenkses were able
to successfully defend the criminal charge against them by claiming medical necessity,176 and
they obtained a Compassionate IND in 1991.177 The case received much publicity, and as a result,
the FDA found itself swamped with Compassionate IND applications from AIDS patients seeking
similar AZT relief.178
Before the surge in the size and publicity of the Compassionate IND Program from 1989 to 1991
the program's size allowed it to exist largely outside of the political debate over recreational
drug use, where the issue of marijuana's medical utility was less clouded by federal drug enforcement
agencies' traditional platform of antipathy toward marijuana. However, the program's newly
heightened profile placed it squarely at odds with an institutionalized anti-marijuana governmental
platform that had continually defied medical authority since the early 1930's.
Not surprisingly, the Compassionate IND Program did not last long once it clashed with the
DEA's anti-marijuana juggernaut. Interestingly, even as the FDA was making plans to suspend
the program, others in the government continued to recognize the medical utility of marijuana
and assure interested parties that they would continue to be able to have access to its benefits.
Deputy National Drug Control Policy Director Herbert Kleper, for example, stated on national
television that anyone who legitimately needed the medical benefits that marijuana provided
would continue to be provided with access through the Compassionate IND Program.179 However,
shortly after this very statement the FDA, under pressure from the Bush administration, suspended
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38the Compassionate IND Program and stopped processing new applications.180
The reasons for this announced suspension indicated again that the government's fear of the
idea of recreational use was still as strong as it had been in 1937, and continued to preclude
any rational discussion of marijuana's potential medical utility. James O. Mason, chief of
the Public Health Service, indicated in no uncertain terms that the chief reason for the suspension
of the program was because the Bush administration feared that legalized medical use of marijuana
would undercut the administration's staunch opposition to the use of illegal drugs.181 Mason
indicated that ``if it is perceived that the Public Health Service is going around giving marihuana
[sic] to folks, there would be a perception that this stuff can't be so bad...It gives a bad
signal.''182 Mason did make a token attempt to provide a medical basis for discontinuing the
program and denying marijuana to the many AIDS-patient-applicants, calling into question the
notion that marijuana held any medical utility for AIDS sufferers.183 He claimed that there
was not ``a shred of proof'' that marijuana offered any assistance to people with AIDS.184 His
contention that marijuana holds no medical utility was also dubious to say the least, in light
of the fact that in that same year the FDA clearly recognized its marijuana's utility for AIDS
patients when it approved a synthetic form of THC (the purported active ingredient in marijuana)
called Marinol for use for treating rapid weight-loss in AIDS patients.185
Apparently, the Bush administration feared that the medical use of marijuana by patients with
a legitimate need was so intertwined with recreational use by drug users that it could not
180See id.
181See id.
182Id.
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184Id.
185See Bergstrom, supra note 3, at 163.
39sanction one without implicitly sanctioning the other. This rationale is rather dubious, however,
when one considers that current federal law still recognizes the medical utility of other equally
dangerous and far more addictive targets of DEA enforcement such as cocaine and morphine despite
the substantial social dangers that are associated with recreational use of those drugs.186
The traditionally close association of marijuana with the recreational drug culture in the
eyes of drug enforcement officials since 1937 has apparently made it impossible even today
for the federal drug enforcement agencies to separate the potential benefits of marijuana's
medical use from the potential dangers of its recreational use in the same way it has done
so with drugs like cocaine and morphine. Consequently, as the federal drug enforcement agencies'
recent schizophrenic policies of publicly denying marijuana's medical utility even while the
FDA quietly recognizes its medical utility on a smaller scale indicated, governmental policies
concerning medical marijuana continue to be characterized by an almost pathological refusal
to accept marijuana's medical utility for fear that such recognition might encourage recreational
use. The same fear of the idea of recreational marijuana use that motivated Harry Anslinger
to tax all marijuana use regardless of medical utility in the 1930's has also motivated the
federal drug enforcement agencies' refusal to reschedule marijuana regardless of medical utility
from the 1970's to the present.
186See Mathre, ed., supra note 131, at 4, citing the presence of cocaine and morphine on the less restrictive Schedule II, for
dangerous drugs that nevertheless have a recognized medical utility, under the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. Marijuana
remains on Schedule I, a more restrictive classication for substances with no recognized medical utility. See id.
40Chapter Two
INTRODUCTION
The DEA's refusal to reschedule marijuana has created a nearly insurmountable obstacle for
proponents of medicinal marijuana seeking to gain acceptance for its medical use. The Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (as revised in 1962) provides a procedure trough which those
who seek the approval of the Food and Drug Administration to commercially manufacture and market
any chemical substance ``affecting bodily structure or function in the absence of disease''
can normally do so.187 This act provides that a sponsor seeking to use or market a substance
for therapeutic purposes can obtain FDA-approval to do so by conducting well-controlled clinical
studies of the substance that prove to the FDA's satisfaction that it is both safe for human
consumption and effective in treating a particular medical condition.188
However, marijuana's current status as a Schedule-I substance under the Controlled Substances
Act makes it next to impossible for anyone seeking to study the medicinal attributes of a Schedule-I
substance to obtain permission to do so.189 Marijuana's Schedule-I status has essentially eliminated
any substantive authority that the FDA would otherwise have over determining the medical potential
of marijuana and placed the final determination of marijuana's medical utility in the hands
187Scott Batterman, Brother Can You Spare a Drug: Should the Experimental Drug Distribution Standards Be Modied in Response to the Needs of Persons With AIDS?,
19 Hofstra L. Rev. 191, 197 (Fall, 1990); See also id. at 201.
188See Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 513 (Peter Barton Hutt & Richard. A. Merrill,
eds., 2d ed., 1995).
189See Nicole Dogwill, The Burning Question: How Will the United States Deal With the Medical-Marijuana Debate?, 1998
Det. C.L. Mich. St. U. L. Rev. 247, 249 (Spring, 1998).
41of the DEA Administrator.190 With the FDA relegated to an consultative role in determining
marijuana's medical utility as long as marijuana remains a Schedule-I drug,191 the DEA possesses
almost total discretion not only in the determination of marijuana's medical utility but also
in the decision as to whether or not to even allow marijuana's medical potential to be studied.192
The DEA has used this discretion to prevent the study of marijuana's medical potential with
a circular line of reasoning that justifies marijuana's Schedule-I status by pointing to the
lack of scientific studies demonstrating its safety and medical efficacy but impedes all efforts
to study marijuana's safety or medical efficacy citing marijuana's Schedule-I status.193
This chapter describes the difficult, expensive, and time-consuming process that would have
to be followed under current federal law to have marijuana rescheduled to allow for medical
study and eventually gain FDA approval to market it for therapeutic purposes. Section A discusses
the FDA's role, first in the rescheduling process, and then in the process for approving a
substance for general marketing and use as a therapeutic substance. Section B illustrates
the argument that although marijuana's approval for therapeutic uses would be by no means guaranteed
even if the FDA had the authority to permit an examination of marijuana's medical potential,
the DEA's consistent and unwavering refusal to reschedule marijuana to allow for the study
of marijuana's medical potential ensures that proponents of marijuana will never have the opportunity
to examine marijuana's medical potential using the FDA's standards.
190See id.
191Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations Comm. on Commerce in the U.S. House of Representatives
(March 11, 1999) (statement of Nicholas Reuter, MPH Associate Director for Domestic and International Drug
Control, Oce of Health Aairs, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human Services).
<http://www.fda.gov/ola/substance.html>.
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42A. THE LONG PROCESS NECESSARY TO GAIN THERAPEUTIC
ACCEPTABILITY FOR MARIJUANA UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Because marijuana is classified as a Schedule-I substance, anyone seeking the right to study
the medicinal attributes of marijuana must complete a rigorous application process in which
they must attempt to convince the DEA that marijuana is safe enough and has enough medical
potential to allow the study of its medical attributes.194 The DEA Administrator has the final
say-so on the approval or rejection of this application,195 and the FDA's role in the process
is limited to that of an informational consultant to the DEA.196 Only after the DEA administrator
approves the application to study marijuana and the clinical tests begin does the FDA's role
in determining the therapeutic utility of marijuana become anything more authoritative than
that of an advisor.
Anyone who wishes to study the medicinal qualities of marijuana must submit an application
to the DEA asking for permission to do so.197 This application must describe ``the nature and
motive behind the research, the security measures in protecting the human subjects,'' and ``the
substances used in conducting such an inquiry.''198 ``A copy of this application is thereupon
sent to the Food & Drug Administration (FDA) for medical evaluation before a final decision
is made...''199 After this application process is completed and the applicant's research protocols
194See Dogwill, supra note 189, at 248-249.
195See Segal, supra note 59, at 243.
196See March 11, 1999 Statement before Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations Comm. on Commerce in the U.S. House of Representatives,
supra note 191.
197See Dogwill, supra note 189, at 249.
198Id.
199Id.
43are approved, the FDA and the DEA review the application so that the DEA Administrator can
decided whether or not to approve it.200 They review the application and decide whether or
not to approve it according to a number of factors including:
``(1) its actual or relative potential for abuse;
(2) Scientific evidence of its pharmacological
effect,if known;
(3) The state of current scientific knowledge
regarding the drug or other substance;
(4) Its history and current pattern of abuse;
(5) The scope, duration, and significance of abuse;
(6) What, if any, risk there is to the public health;
(7) Its psychic or physiological dependence
liability; and
(8) Whether the substance is an immediate precursor
of a substance already controlled under this
subchapter.''201
If the DEA decides that marijuana is safe enough under this criteria to allow for the study
of its medicinal attributes, it will consider the possibility of rescheduling marijuana.202
At this stage, the DEA Administrator still retains ultimate authority to decide whether or
not to allow the medical study of marijuana, and he/she is granted wide discretion in this
decision under the Controlled Substances Act.203 Only if the DEA Administrator decides that
marijuana should be rescheduled to allow for the study of its medical attributes can someone
200See id.
202See Dogwill, supra note 189, at 249.
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44seeking to use marijuana therapeutically begin the long process of obtaining the FDA's permission
to use or market marijuana therapeutically.
Even if the DEA administrator should decide to allow the rescheduling of marijuana so that
its medical potential can be studied, marijuana's journey from status as a Schedule-I substance
to status as a legally marketable drug is far from over. As a controlled substance, marijuana
must also meet the FDA's requirements for safety and medical effectiveness before it can be
marketed for therapeutic use. The 1962 Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
require any entity seeking to develop and market any potentially medically useful pharmacological
substance that affects the structure or function of the body in an absence of any disease to
obtain the affirmative approval of the Food and Drug Administration prior to any such marketing.204
Moreover, This three-stage application process often takes many years, and begins for the substance's
sponsor long before it ever actually presents a formal application to the FDA requesting the
right to market the substance.
STAGE 1---PRECLINICAL INVESTIGATION IN PREPARATION OF THE
IND APPLICATION
The first stage of this application process, where the sponsor of the substance compiles preliminary
clinical data on a potential drug and prepares a plan of study for presentation to the FDA
in the formal request to test it on humans205, is known as the preclinical stage. This preclinical
research is performed by the sponsor for the potential drug, usually a pharmaceutical company.206
Most of the research at the preclinical stage is performed without direct supervision from
204See Batterman, supra note 187, at 197; See also id. at 201.
205See id. at 286-287.
206See id.
45the Food and Drug Administration.207 However, the FDA demands a lot of information on the nature
of the substance being tested as well as the methodological quality of the scientific investigation
in making its decision as to whether or not to approve a potential drug for general marketing.208
These informational demands create de facto requirements for preclinical studies that heavily
influence both the type and the direction of the research that takes place even at this early
stage.209
Preclinical research begins when the sponsor pharmaceutical company comes up with a pharmacological
concept.210 They must have a biological mechanism they are seeking to regulate and/or some
sort of chemical lead that they will be able to follow.211 One or both of these must be important
some how to a particular target disease that the sponsor is seeking to combat.212 Since the
process of developing and gaining approval for a new drug can take as many as 12 years and
cost as much as 231 million dollars, the sponsor must closely examine the current state of
scientific knowledge regarding the target disease and critically evaluate the probability that
the research will yield scientific and/or marketing success before deciding whether or not
to commit the resources needed to see this application process through to its conclusion.213
Once a chemical lead or a connection between a target disease and a biological mechanism is
established, scientists prepare various chemical compounds that could potentially affect that
mechanism and test these compounds in a wide variety of test systems from laboratory animals
to subcellular particles.214 Those chemical compounds which emerge from these tests having
207Report of the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th
Cong. (1980), reprinted in Peter Barton Hutt & Richard A. Merrill, Food and Drug Law 514 (Peter Barton Hutt &
Richard. A. Merrill, eds., 2d ed., 1995).
208See Batterman, supra note 187, at 202.
209See Hutt & Merrill, eds., supra note 207, at 514.
210See id.
211See id.
212See id.
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46some potential prophylactic or therapeutic utility are then subjected to a battery of toxicological
tests using at least three different species of laboratory animals.215 These studies are intended
to help scientists determine the dosages at which these compounds become lethal.216 Various
pathological studies are also performed on the animals to which the compounds are administered
in order to determine the organ toxicity the substance produces in these animals.217 The estimated
effective dosages in a series of animal species models are compared with the estimated lethal
dosages in that same species series to arrive at what is known as a therapeutic ratio.218 Those
compounds with satisfactory therapeutic ratios are then considered for clinical study in humans.219
The testing that has taken place to this point has eliminated many chemical compounds from
consideration for testing in humans, and only a few of the hundreds of chemical compounds originally
found to have potential will be considered for testing in humans.220 Those chemical compounds
still considered suitable for study in humans must now undergo further toxicological evaluations
to determine how animals metabolize and/or excrete the substance.221 Finally, the substance
is prepared in a more stable, bioavailable form.222
Once the drug has been prepared, the sponsor must then file a Notice of Claimed Exemption for
an Investigational New Drug (hereinafter an IND Application) with the FDA.223 This is the formal
application requesting the permission from the FDA to begin testing the drug on humans.224 The
FDA requires the sponsor to include extensive information about the preclinical testing on
their IND Application. Among the information required is information on the substance's chemical
215See Hutt & Merrill, eds., supra note 207 at 514-515.
216See id. at 515.
217See id.
218See id.
219See id.
220See id.
221See id.
222See id.
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47formula, the biological source of the substance, and the procedure by which the sponsor manufactures
the drug.225 In addition, the FDA requires information on short-term as well as long-term studies
using at least two different species of animals.226
In addition to describing the details of the preclinical testing that has taken place prior
to the submission of the IND Application, the IND Application must describe the sponsor, the
sponsor's plans for investigation, a detailed breakdown of the three phases of investigation
under the IND application,227 and the scientific qualifications of the people that the sponsor
has obtained to conduct the studies.228 Once this information has been compiled and submitted
to the FDA, the FDA has 30 days to evaluate the IND Application to determine whether or not
they will allow the sponsor to continue their investigation with human trials.229
In deciding whether to allow the sponsor to begin human testing, the FDA seeks to assure the
safety of the human subjects, evaluate the adequacy of the laboratory-animal studies completed
during the preclinical stage, evaluate the merits of the sponsor's research plan, and evaluate
the scientific qualifications of the personnel who will be conducting the human trials.230 If,
after 30 days, the FDA has not notified the sponsor that he cannot begin the human studies,
the sponsor can begin the second stage of the application process---the three-phase process
for human clinical trials required under FDA law.231 The preclinical phase of this process
can take anywhere from one to four years, and must be completed to the satisfaction of the
FDA before any testing of humans can begin.232
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48STAGE 2---THE 3-PHASE HUMAN INVESTIGATION PROCESS
The next stage of the process of FDA approval for the marketing of a new drug is where the
drug sponsors conduct clinical testing of the drugs on humans under an FDA-mandated three-phase
clinical testing scheme.233 These tests are performed in order to determine how safe the drug
is for human consumption as well as how effective the drug is in the treatment of the diseases
or disorders that the drug is intended to treat.234
Phase I of the FDA-mandated clinical testing system is the first time in the application process
that pharmacologists administer the test drug to humans. Even at this stage, however, the
FDA requires these pharmacologists to thoroughly review the data collected during the preclinical
stage of the process, and to conduct further preclinical investigation if it turns out that
informational inadequacies in the IND Application somehow escaped the attention of the FDA.235
Once the informational inadequacies in the preclinical research are remedied, the human testing
can begin.
Generally, the tests administered to humans in this phase serve only a marginal therapeutic
purpose, if they serve a therapeutic purpose at all.236 The primary purpose of human testing
in Phase I is to give investigators an initial idea of the nature of possible side effects
of the test drug.237 Consequently, the test drug in Phase I is usually administered to healthy
subjects, rather than patients afflicted with the target disorder.238 Human test subjects in
233See Batterman, supra note 187, at 221.
234See id. at 221-222.
235See Hutt & Merrill, eds., supra note 207, at 516.
236See Arnold, supra note 229, at 1081-1082.
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238See Marsha N. Cohen, Getting New Drugs to People with AIDS: A Public Policy Response to Lansdale, 18 Hastings
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49Phase I studies often include prison inmates or the urban poor.239 During Phase I testing,
investigators gather extensive data regarding absorption, distribution, and excretion rates
for the test drug, as well as information on the drug's metabolites.240 Phase I testers usually
begin by administering the test drug at low doses and then gradually increase the dosage amounts
and frequencies if the single doses cause no side effects in the test subjects.241 From this,
the judges attempt to determine the potential side effects that could result from increasing
the frequency of the dosages and/or amount of each dosage.242 Throughout Phase I of the human
trials, investigators perform many batteries of laboratory tests on the human subjects in order
to identify any side effects that the test drug might be causing in the test subjects at different
times.243 These tests, too, are primarily concerned with determining the safety of the drug,
and provide little or no information about the test drug's effectiveness.244 Conclusions about
the test drug's effectiveness, however, are not expected during Phase I. Phase I testing primarily
focuses on safety, and only if testers find adverse effects caused by the drug that will limit
the use of the drug will the human testing be abandoned before Phase II.
The fact that a drug's therapeutic viability survives Phase I of human testing in no way insures
that the FDA will approve the drug for general marketing. Phase I studies are usually of a
limited scope, involving not more than 20 to 100 human test subjects,245 and as a result, they
usually provide only a preliminary look at the safety of the test drug.246 Since Phase I involves
239See Crites-Leoni, supra note 140, at 287.
240See id.
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50a relatively small number of human test subjects, it is still possible that the drug could
produce serious adverse side effects that occur at too low of a frequency to be detected in
the small pool of Phase I test subjects.247 Moreover, because these drugs are rarely tested
on medical patients during this phase of testing, Phase I usually provides no more than a preliminary
gauge of the drug's effectiveness.248 Consequently, the FDA requires further human testing
in Phases II and III.
If Phase I of the investigation reveals no significant safety concerns, investigators will
begin Phase II of the human testing scheme.249 Phase II is the first time investigators test
the test drug using human subjects who suffer from the test drug's target disease or diseases.250
Although Phase II studies involve more human subjects than did Phase I, the numbers of test
subjects are still relatively small compared to the numbers that will be utilized during Phase
III. At most, Phase II testing will involve several hundred human subjects.251
It is not so much the number of human subjects as it is the focus of Phase II investigation
that truly distinguishes it from the testing performed in Phase I. Although investigators in
Phase II testing, as in Phase I testing, focus somewhat on providing more safety assurances
and searching for any short-term side effects the drug might cause, Phase II investigators
focus their investigation more on determining the effectiveness of the drug at this stage.252
Consequently, Phase II studies are highly specialized and tailored to best observe the interactions
of the test drug with its target disease.253
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51Because of the focus on effectiveness in Phase II, Phase II investigators take great care to
select human test subjects who are without confounding conditions that could taint the validity
of any effectiveness data obtained.254 Consequently, investigators try to minimize the influence
of extraneous factors on patient health improvement so that they can better determine how much
of a patient's improvement is actually the result of the drug's effect and how much of that
improvement is the result of other factors.255 They try to avoid selecting test subjects who
suffer from medical conditions other than the conditions that the test drug is designed to
affect, or subjects who are receiving simultaneous treatments for medical conditions other
than the target conditions.256
In addition to trying to minimize other affirmative factors such as alternative treatments
which might influence the test subject's health, investigators also attempt to distinguish
patient improvements resulting from the drug's effect from patient improvements resulting from
a phenomenon called the ``placebo effect''.257 The ``placebo effect'' is a term that describes
the phenomenon occurring in all medical drug testing where the conditions of a certain number
of patient test subjects will appear to improve as a result of any treatment regimen regardless
of whether that treatment actually has any medical utility or not.258 Distinguishing the influence
of the ``placebo effect'' from the influence of the drug is important to investigators in building
their case regarding the test drug's effectiveness. Consequently, although no statute or regulation
actually require that the investigators use placebo-controlled studies or double-blind studies
during Phase II testing, investigators still commonly utilize such studies to obtain data in
254See Cohen, supra note 238, at 473.
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52support of their claims of the drug's effectiveness.259
In addition to tailoring their Phase II studies to minimize extraneous factors influencing
patient health, investigators also tailor Phase II studies to determine more specific information
regarding the test drug's safety and effectiveness. Typically, studies in Phase II begin with
single dose studies and then gradually increase the amount of each dose and the frequency of
dosage consumption.260 This type of study is used so that the investigators can obtain more
specific data on safety and effectiveness such as whether or not the drug has the investigators'
desired effect, the optimum dosage level for producing this desired effect, and whether or
not the drug produces any side effects that would force patients to limit their use of the
drug.261
Typically, Phase II testing can take anywhere from several months to two years to complete.262
A lack of effectiveness discovered during Phase II usually leads to abandonment of the application
process at this stage.263 However, even if a drug proves effective in the small test pool used
in Phase II, more widespread testing is required in Phase III to get a better idea of the drug's
effectiveness.264 Likewise, a lack of adverse effects attributable to the drug even at the
Phase II level cannot assure that the drug is safe enough for widespread distribution.265 Consequently,
drugs that prove safe and effective at the Phase II level must still undergo a more extensive
series of studies in Phase III.266
Phase III studies are constructed much like Phase II studies, except that the population of
259See id.
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53human test subjects is generally much larger.267 Where Phase II studies rarely utilize a test
subject population of more than several hundred, Phase III studies utilize a test subject population
of anywhere from several hundred to several thousand people.268 Like Phase II studies, Phase
III studies are conducted with an eye toward gathering additional information on the drug's
effectiveness as well as its safety.269 In addition, investigators seek to establish a risk-benefit
ratio for the test drug.270 Phase III investigators also look to gather more specific information
on matters such as dosage levels and schedules that produce the best patient results.271 Also,
like Phase II investigators, Phase III investigators commonly utilize masked, comparative studies
comparing the test drug's effectiveness with that of either a placebo or a standard drug if
another drug for treating the target disease exists.272
A key difference between Phase II studies and Phase III studies is that unlike Phase II studies,
Phase III studies are generally conducted in a setting meant to approximate the environment
in which the drug's general use would take place more closely than in Phase II. Where Phase
II studies are designed to minimize the extraneous factors that might affect a patient's response
to the test drug,273 Phase III investigators conduct both controlled and uncontrolled clinical
trials.274 Phase III studies are not designed so strictly to eliminate outside drug-interactions
or outside factor influences. Instead, the investigators simply closely monitor the test subjects
in the ``general-use-like'' Phase III environment looking for potential adverse patient reactions
or interactions of the test drug with other drugs or medications the test subject may have
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54taken. Investigators allow a greater number of extraneous factors to influence the effects
of the drug on the test subject and monitoring those outside factors, hoping to gain a rough
idea of the drug's safety and effectiveness when used in a ``real-world setting'' approximating
the usage conditions that would exist if the drug were approved for general marketing.
Even at this level, investigators may still uncover side effects occurring at low frequencies
in test subjects using the drug.275 However, once a drug's effectiveness is established, discovery
of a risk of an adverse side effect will not automatically lead to the abandonment of the application
or to the rejection of that application.276 Instead, ultimate approval or denial of the application
at this point is determined by scientists and policymakers who compare the drug's benefits
with the level of risk that the drug will produce adverse side effects.277 Decisionmakers tend
to tolerate a higher level of risk from a drug that targets a life-threatening condition than
from a drug intended to treat a non-life-threatening condition or a condition for which a safer
alternative treatment already exists.278
Typically, Phase III can take anywhere from one to three years.279 At the end of Phase III,
the test drug's sponsors compile the data from at lease two of these Phase III studies and
submit it to the FDA as a formal New Drug Application (hereinafter, NDA).280 Only after the
submission of the NDA does the application process enter the third stage, where the FDA examines
the NDA and decides whether or not to approve the drug for general marketing.
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55STAGE 3---SUBMISSION AND FDA EXAMINATION OF THE NDA
Only 10 percent of all the prospective drugs for which sponsors file an IND still have enough
merit to file the formal NDA with the Food and Drug Administration after they are subjected
to the rigors of the FDA's mandatory three-phase process of human testing.281 If a drug's sponsor
is fortunate enough to posses one of the few drugs that are worthy of an NDA, that sponsor
must file the formal NDA with the FDA so that it can begin the lengthy process of examining
the application to determine whether or not the data presents enough evidence of the drug's
safety and effectiveness to allow its general marketing.282 FDA review of an NDA is, like the
other phases of the application, a lengthy process that requires a great deal of information.
The typical NDA contains anywhere from two to 15 volumes of material that summarizes the study's
raw data and up to 200,000 pages of raw data.283 NDA's are rarely significantly shorter than
this because of the high volume of information the FDA requires in making its decision on the
NDA. The FDA requires that all information regarding the drug's safety and effectiveness, favorable
as well as unfavorable, be included in the NDA.284 The NDA must also contain detailed information
regarding the manufacture of the drug as well as the steps the sponsor will take to assure
the drug's quality.285 The FDA also demands detailed and voluminous information from the sponsor
regarding clinical testing in both the preclinical trial stage and the human testing stage
of the application process.286 In evaluating the safety of a drug, for example, the FDA requires
all information available on aspects of the drug such as:
``1. The interaction of the drug with body
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56processes, including: hormonal, enzymic,
metabolic, and reproductive processes.
2.
The manner in which the drug is absorbed,
distributed in the body tissues, and
inactivated or excreted.....
3.
Whether active compounds arise from the
metabolism of the drug by the body.
4.
The influence of other chemicals, such as
other drugs or even articles of food or
drink upon the activity of the drug in
question.
5.
How the activity of the drug in animals
compares with its activity in man....''287
The high volume of information that the FDA must comb through in evaluating the NDA often results
in long delays in the rendering of an ultimate decision on the sponsor's NDA. By law, the FDA
is supposed to render a ruling on the suitability of the drug for public use within 180 days.288
However, the FDA can, with the consent of the sponsor, withhold a final ruling on the new drug's
288See Arnold, supra note 229 at 1082.
57suitability if it needs more information.289 Moreover, the time that it takes the FDA to make
a decision on an NDA has been increasing steadily.290 The time that typically elapsed from
the time the FDA originally received an NDA to its final approval by the FDA was a little more
than a year in 1963.291 It has doubled to around 28 months since then.292 The FDA's process
of sifting through the volumes of information contained in the NDA can prove as time-consuming
as the clinical trials themselves.
In the end, however, no amount of NDA information can ever provide the same amount of information
about a drug that general use of that drug would provide.293 Test pools of several thousand
subjects simply won't reveal as much effectiveness information or as many risk factors as will
the potential pool of millions of users that would result from the general marketing or use
of the drug.294 In addition, not even Phase III clinical studies can properly duplicate the
possible complications that could result from the use of the drug by patients who have been
misdiagnosed and actually suffer from some other malady, or the risks associated with the use
of the drug by doctors not fully familiar with the proper methods of administering the drug.295
Essentially, not even the most expensive clinical investigations will eliminate all risk or
provide fully conclusive evidence of effectiveness.
Consequently, the FDA will either ultimately approve or reject the FDA based on a comparison
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58of the espoused benefits of the drug with the risks associated with the drug.296 If the FDA
determines, after a risk-benefit analysis, that it is in the public interest to allow the sponsor
to market the drug, then it will do so.297 No statute or regulation sets forth any specific
criteria that the FDA must follow in performing this risk-benefit analysis, and the FDA is
allowed a certain degree of subjectivity in its decision-making on this issue.298 As a result,
decisions as to whether a drug is to be approved are often quite controversial.299 If approval
is rendered, general marketing can begin. If the FDA is planning on rejecting a sponsor's
NDA, the FDA must allow the drug's sponsor a hearing to determine the drug's safety and effectiveness,
the sponsor's ability to consistently manufacture the drug, and whether or not the benefits
of the drug outweigh its risks when used properly.300
The time and money that a drug's sponsor could potentially have to invest to push an IND Application
from the preclinical stage through NDA analysis is tremendous. The whole process could take
as long as 12 years and cost as much as 231 million dollars.301 Since it could take a pharmaceutical
company years to recoup the costs of an IND Application even if it is ultimately successful,
the FDA's new drug approval process is generally only a realistic option for deep-pocketed
corporations that can afford to take the substantial financial risk.302
296See Hutt & Merrill, eds., supra note 287 at 522.
297See id.
298See Arnold, supra note 229, at 1082-1083.
299See id.
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59B. CURRENT OBSTACLES TO THE FEDERAL LEGALIZATION OF
MEDICINAL MARIJUANA
OBSTACLES TO FEDERAL LEGALIZATION OF MEDICINAL
MARIJUANA INHERENT IN THE NATURE OF MARIJUANA
Even an improvement in the objectivity of governmental attitudes toward marijuana would by
no means guarantee marijuana a free ride from contraband status into status as a legal and
prescribable drug. As Section A's description of the FDA's new drug approval procedure illustrates,
anyone seeking to sponsor marijuana as a potential prescription drug must work through a number
of rather substantial ``marijuana-neutral'' obstacles in order to meet the FDA's requirements.
Marijuana is not exactly well-suited to skate through the FDA's drug approval procedures.
One problem that creates an obstacle to FDA new-drug-approval is the fact that the marijuana
plant cannot be patented.303 While this fact presents no substantive problems in terms of proving
marijuana's safety or effectiveness, it nonetheless creates substantial bureaucratic obstacles
to conducting the studies necessary to meet the FDA's informational demands for all NDA's.
The process of applying for FDA permission to market a new drug is extremely expensive and
time-consuming.304 The application, from the preclinical stage through the FDA's final ruling
on the sponsor's NDA, can take up to 12 years to complete and cost the sponsor as much as 231
million dollars.305 The immense investment of time and money required to obtain approval to
303See id.
304See Arnold, supra note 229, at 1083.
305See id.
60market a new drug severely limits the entities who have the financial ability to sponsor a
potential new drug. Moreover, the pharmaceutical companies that usually make these investments
will not sponsor a potential drug unless they feel that the drug will be profitable.306
The 20-year period during which pharmaceutical companies hold can patent control over the new
drug, and can consequently price their newly-approved drug somewhat more ``monopolistically'',
is generally where pharmaceutical companies recoup the expenses they incur during the new drug
application process.307 Since marijuana cannot be patented, however, prospective drug sponsors
cannot count on any such 20-year monopoly during which they would normally recoup the costs
of the IND Application.308 Few entities with the financial wherewithal to invest in an IND
Application for marijuana are willing to invest in seeking the approval of a drug for which
they cannot even obtain a temporary patent monopoly.
Another factor that would undoubtedly complicate the process of obtaining FDA approval for
medicinal use of the marijuana plant is the fact that marijuana contains a complex mixture
of many different chemicals, as opposed to the typical prospective drug comprised of a few
well-defined chemical compounds at most.309 Moreover, because individual patients smoke marijuana
differently, and the complex mixture of chemicals that makes up marijuana varies somewhat from
plant to plant, it is more difficult for investigators to control the chemical dosage from
test subject to test subject.310 Since the FDA generally demands assurances that a drug's sponsor
demonstrate how it will assure dosage stability before it will approve an NDA,311 the marijuana
306See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 256.
307See id.
308See id.
309See Mark A. R. Kleinman, Marijuana: Costs of Abuse, Costs of Control 165-166 (1989).
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61plant's complex and often varied chemical structure would present significant problems to investigators
trying to allay the safety concerns that marijuana's dosage inconsistencies would elicit in
FDA decision-makers.
Another of marijuana's characteristics that would also likely complicate any marijuana IND
Application is the method typically used by patients to take marijuana. Marijuana is typically
smoked.312 Currently, no drug that is introduced into the system by smoking is listed on the
pharmacopoeia.313 Pharmaceutical companies have attempted to circumvent this difficulty by
creating a drug containing a synthetic version of THC (one of the active ingredients in marijuana)
that could be taken orally,314 but for many patients, this pill is prohibitively expensive.315
Moreover, most patients have reported that natural marijuana was more effective in treating
their symptoms.316 Furthermore, since one of marijuana's main espoused therapeutic uses is
as a treatment for the nausea associated with other treatments such as cancer chemotherapy
and the synthetic pill's effectiveness depends primarily on the patient's ability to keep from
vomiting, oral ingestion of a pill has often proved significantly less effective than natural
marijuana in achieving marijuana's therapeutic results. The smoking of natural marijuana appears
to be the most effective and affordable method of obtaining marijuana's therapeutic benefits.
However, this method of drug delivery is not currently approved for any drugs on the pharmacopoeia
and could further complicate any IND Application for marijuana.
OBSTACLES TO FEDERAL LEGALIZATION OF MEDICINAL
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62MARIJUANA CREATED BY FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Although the FDA's pre-market approval demands for expensive and time-consuming safety studies
and its requirements that sponsors demonstrate their drug's dosage-stability would undoubtedly
present significant ``marijuana-neutral'' institutional obstacles to a marijuana IND Application,
those institutional obstacles wouldn't inevitably lead to the rejection of any marijuana IND
Application. In the end, after all, the FDA's decision to approve or reject an IND Application
is based essentially on a balancing of the drug's potential benefits and the risks associated
with its use.317
At times the FDA has relaxed its usual procedural requirements for pre-market drug approval
when it determines that the potential benefits of a drug are significant enough, or the disease
to be treated serious enough, to mandate a more relaxed approval standard. For example, the
FDA allowed the AIDS-treatment drug AZT to complete the clinical testing phase in under 2 years
instead of forcing it to complete the usual seven-to-ten-year process.318
If federal drug enforcement agencies would ever allow the studies that would determine marijuana's
effectiveness to be conducted, the seriousness of conditions (such as AIDS wasting syndrome)319
that marijuana is purported to treat could well lead to a similarly relaxed drug-approval process
despite the dosage control and chemical make-up questions that marijuana poses. However, the
DEA refuses to accept the anecdotal evidence demonstrating marijuana's safety and medical effectiveness
that medical marijuana proponents must currently use in their requests for permission to study
marijuana's effects. In addition to refusing to accept the validity of existing medical marijuana
317See Hutt & Merrill, eds., supra note 287, at 522.
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63studies, the DEA also actively impedes all efforts to perform studies that might provide enough
evidence of marijuana's safety or medical utility to meet the DEA's evidentiary requirements
for rescheduling. the DEA's active refusal to allow any significant clinical exploration of
marijuana's medical utility has kept the question of whether marijuana could meet the FDA's
institutional requirements from even coming into play. Thus, despite the ``marijuana-neutral''
policies of the FDA regarding the study and approval of new drugs, federal drug enforcement
agencies continue to ensure that marijuana never becomes an acceptable therapeutic substance
by frustrating all efforts to prove it's medical utility through clinical studies.
As they did during the Anslinger era, the drug enforcement agencies of the federal government
continue to impede all efforts in the medical community to study the medicinal potential of
marijuana so that medical experts never even get the opportunity to judge marijuana's medical
utility based on its empirical merits. The ``Anslingerian'' anti-marijuana symbolism still
prevalent in the DEA's policies manifests itself in the DEA's circular policy of refusing to
reschedule marijuana because of the lack of empirical studies demonstrating its safety and
utility while refusing to allow anyone to conduct such studies because of marijuana's Schedule-I
status.
Federal officials have taken to responding to increasing and more persuasive claims of marijuana's
therapeutic value by ``urging others to investigate its medical potential'' so these groups
can meet the DEA's safety and effectiveness standards and then ``creating obstacles that make
the research impossible.''320 It appears that even when the FDA approves the protocol for a
study examining the potential medical utility of marijuana, federal drug enforcement agencies
320Id. at 257-8.
64take steps to ensure that those conducting the study never obtain the marijuana necessary to
complete it.
This sabotage of efforts to study marijuana's medical attributes is well-illustrated in the
events immediately following the DEA's fifth and final rejection of a marijuana-rescheduling
petition in 1992. In rejecting the rescheduling petition, the then-head of the DEA Richard
Bonner advised proponents of marijuana rescheduling that their efforts might be more efficiently
spent conducting studies to prove marijuana's medical utility rather than pouring their efforts
into political lobbying or litigation.321 Dr. Don Abrams of the University of California at
San Francisco was encouraged by Mr. Bonner's statement, and decided to take his advice.322
He set up a study designed in conjunction with and approved by the FDA to compare various dosage-levels
of smoked-marijuana to orally-ingested dronabinol capsules in treating AIDS wasting syndrome.323
However, when he sought to obtain the marijuana necessary to conduct the study, the government
denied him this marijuana at every turn. The National Institute of Drug Abuse would not allow
him to obtain the marijuana from the government-owned marijuana farm, and the DEA refused to
allow him to obtain the marijuana by importation.324
The federal government's drug enforcement agencies have feigned objectivity and open-mindedness
by claiming that marijuana has no medical utility and basing their rejection of efforts to
legalize medicinal marijuana on a lack of well-controlled studies demonstrating marijuana's
medical efficacy. However, the true sensibilities of federal drug enforcement agencies are
revealed when these agencies use their control over the marijuana supply to ensure that studies
321See id. at 257.
322See id.
323See id.
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65proving marijuana's medical potential can never be conducted.
This recent governmental strategy of impeding all efforts to conduct studies that might contradict
the DEA's position on marijuana's medical utility evokes memories of the Anslinger-era politics,
where Harry Anslinger based is campaign against marijuana on largely unsubstantiated medical
claims about the effects of marijuana and then used his political influence to suppress and
impede the propagation of any evidence that might have contradicted his medical claims.325 The
similarities between federal drug enforcement agencies' current suppression of therapeutic
claims regarding marijuana and the Anslinger-era regime's suppression of all marijuana-supporting
medical studies illustrates the large extent to which ``Anslingerian'' symbolism continues
to dominate the federal government's approach to the medical marijuana issue. Furthermore,
they illustrate the large extent to which these ``Anslingerian'' anti-marijuana sensibilities
continue to manifest themselves in federal drug enforcement agencies' consistent and pathological
refusal to allow any rational exploration of marijuana's medical potential that might demonstrate
that marijuana is anything other than an unequivocal menace.
Federal drug-enforcement agencies justify their resistance to the study of marijuana by arguing
that the threat of encouraging illicit marijuana use is too great to allow the medical community
to even study marijuana's medical potential.326 In justifying the termination of the Compassionate
IND program in the face of increasing evidence of marijuana's medical utility in 1992, government
officials indicated a collective fear that in allowing research on the medical attributes of
marijuana they would somehow be contributing to a notion that marijuana-smoking must not be
325See discussion supra Chapter 1, Section B.
326See Kleinman, supra note 309, at 166.
66as dangerous as its general illicit status would otherwise indicate.327 Federal drug enforcement
officials argue that allowing the study of medical marijuana would give an implicit stamp of
acceptability to marijuana that would lead inevitably to an increase in illicit use.328 This
argument loses much of its persuasiveness, however, upon an examination of other dangerous
controlled substances that drug enforcement agencies still allowed to be used medically.
The federal drug enforcement agencies argue that medicinal marijuana availability would encourage
illicit use by leading to a ``leakage'' of medicinal marijuana into the arena of illegal use,
and by causing the public to view marijuana in a more positive light than it would in the absence
of medical acceptability. An examination of another dangerous drug that currently resides
on Schedule II of the Controlled Substances Act, however, casts doubt on this governmental
claim. Cocaine is a controlled substance with a history of both illicit use and addiction
that has been placed on the Controlled Substance Act's Schedule II,329 which allows for medical
use but still strictly forbids nonmedical use.330 However, cocaine's availability for medical
use has not contributed significantly to an increased use or availability of cocaine for illegal
purposes, nor has cocaine's Schedule-II-status caused public attitudes toward its safety or
acceptability to significantly change.331
The negative symbolism associated with marijuana use that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics propagated
and popularized during the 1930's still impedes the study of medicinal marijuana today. The
federal government's drug enforcement officials employ an argument that medical marijuana would
lead inevitably lead to an increase in illicit use to impede efforts to study medical marijuana
327See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 22.
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67even though their argument is directly undercut by both the fact that cocaine is dangerous
but available for medical use and the fact that cocaine's medical availability has not led
to an increase in its illegal use. This type of inconsistent logic and self-contradiction
by drug enforcement officials with respect to the medical marijuana issue indicates that the
years have still not significantly dulled the influence of ``Anslingerian'' anti-marijuana
sensibilities on current medical marijuana policies. More specifically, it indicates that
federal drug enforcement officials are no more prepared to separate recreational marijuana
use from medical marijuana use or rationally examine the therapeutic potential of marijuana
today than Harry Anslinger was in the early 1940's when he engineered the suppression of any
marijuana studies that reflected marijuana's medical utility to protect America from the recreational
menace.
68CONCLUSION
Federal law has made it virtually impossible to legally posess, use, or sell in America since
1937.332 Since that time, federal drug enforcement agencies have seen to it that little or
no substantial research on the effects of marijuana could take place in America. As the preceding
chapters have indicated, federal governmental motives for banning marijuana use in 1937 were
grounded far more in prejudicial notions that the ``decent people'' of America needed to be
protected from the violent behavior of the socially marginal groups who used marijuana recreationally
than any notions that marijuana lacked medical utility.
During the 1930's and 1940's, Harry Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics waged an
anti-marijuana propaganda campaign that associated marijuana so completely with negative images
of violent and ``doped-up'' minorities wreaking havoc on the good citizens of America that
when Anslinger began suppressing any studies that suggested that marijuana might have therapeutic
potential, even the American Medical Association offered little resistance.333 After all, fending
off the perceived social plague that marijuana threatened to unleash on American society required
certain sacrifices. The actions of the officials in the Federal Bureau of Narcotics indicated
that they believed (and worked diligently to ensure that the public also believed) that the
social threat that recreational marijuana use posed was so substantial that to even allow the
consideration of marijuana's medical potential would pose an unacceptably high risk of encouraging
recreational use.
332See Grinspoon & Bakalar, supra note 1, at 8.
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69Subsequent evaluation of the propaganda that the FBN used to justify its push for anti-marijuana
legislation revealed that most of the propaganda that the FBN used to generate public fear
of marijuana ``was not...based on rational or credible evidence.''334 However, the negative
imagery with which marijuana became associated during the height of anti-marijuana hysteria
in the 1930's and 1940's has still continued to dominate the approach that federal drug enforcement
agencies have taken in dealing with marijuana from the 1930's to the present.
Federal drug enforcement agencies continue to demonstrate a complete inability to separate
the issue of medical marijuana use from the negative imagery with which marijuana has been
associated since the tenure of Harry Anslinger in the FBN. DEA officials continue to refuse
to legally recognize any medical potential in marijuana because they fear that an examination
of its medical properties would signal an acceptability in marijuana that would lead inevitably
to an increase in the social demon of recreational use. They argue this despite the fact they
allow other dangerous drugs such as cocaine to be used medically but not recreationally and
this has not caused a significant change in public attitudes regarding cocaine or a significant
increase in illicit recreational cocaine use.335
In the end, however, no amount of contradictory empirical evidence has carried enough weight
with federal drug enforcement agencies to elicit any increased willingness to allow marijuana's
therapeutic utility to be explored. When the DEA's empirical arguments are exhausted, they
simply fall back by setting an evidentiary standard of safety and effectiveness that must be
met before medical use can begin and then impeding all efforts to gather the evidence necessary
to meet that standard. This strategy closely mirrors the strategy (propagating a negative
334Bilz, supra note 5, at 119.
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70image marijuana and suppressing any studies that contradicted this image) that Harry Anslinger
utilized to gain the passage of the first anti-marijuana legislation in 1930's and 1940's.
Moreover, it demonstrates that the DEA's approach to dealing with marijuana is just as dominated
by the ``Anslingerian'' images of marijuana as a chemical pariah today as the FBN was in the
1930's and 1940's.
It is clear that much must be learned about the effects of marijuana before it could ever be
approved by the FDA for general medical use. The plant has a complex chemical structure with
many active ingredients that interact to produce its effects on the human body.336 The chemicals,
their interaction with each other, and with the human body would undoubtedly need to be studied
according to the FDA's new-drug-approval guidelines to determine the nature of the risks they
pose and of the therapeutic benefits they offer before general therapeutic use of marijuana
could begin.
However, it is also clear that marijuana does posess some degree of therapeutic utility
and that the refusal of federal drug enforcement agencies to recognize this fact results
more from ``Anslingerian'' political concerns about recreational use than from any
empirical evidence refuting claims that marijuana possesses medical potential. Given
that the original justifications for banning medical marijuana use have been found to be
grounded more in political propaganda than in credible evidence, it seems illogical not
to reschedule marijuana, so that the facts about marijuana can be separated from the
hysterical mythology, and so marijuana's medical potential can be studied. If marijuana
336See id. at 165-166.
71were a Schedule-II substance, the FDA would have more authority over determining
marijuana's medical utility. At least then the authority to decide the extent of
marijuana's medical utility would be based more on empirical medical concerns and a
little less on politically-charged ``Anslingerian'' anti-marijuana politics.
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